Der Rest der NATO schuldet den USA Geld, so sieht es Donald Trump. Denn er glaubt, die NATO sei ein US business Angebot für das die Europäer bisher haben anschreiben lassen. Genau wie in der Debatte um den deutschen Außenhandelsüberschuss lenkt Trump mit seiner Terminologie und seinem Gerede vom eigentlichen Problem ab. 

Dieser Text von Olivier de France und Sophia Besch (full disclosure: meiner CER Kollegin) erklärt sehr gut, worum es eigentlich geht

Two points most people can agree on: first, European allies need to spend more money on defence and step up to their responsibilities within NATO. Second, the 2 percent metric is fundamentally flawed. ... Would it not be possible to come up with a European metric that looks to European aims and interests, is forward looking, output-focused and creates consensus on both side of the Rhine?

Und offenbar fehlt es in Europa schon an einigen basics. Daten zum Beispiel:

Firstly, the EU should compile current levels of defence spending according to a common EU methodology, built for the purpose of comparing like to like. Surprisingly, this does not exist.

Doch der Text hält auch eine Warnung bereit für die Sigmar Gabriels und Martin Schulz' dieser Welt, die angebliches "Wettrüsten" im Wahlkampf gegen Angela Merkel nutzen wollen, um bei den Friedensbewegten auf Wählerfang zu gehen.

European efforts to emancipate its defence spending debate from the United States should not be an excuse for the EU to forget once more that hard power is useful in a chaotic neighbourhood - as a way to protect Europe from threats, as a diplomatic lingua franca, and simply as a tool of statecraft. Central and Eastern European states that face the threat of a belligerent Russia on their borders are likely to disagree with Gabriel about the importance of tanks.